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BACK TO BASICS: DISTINGUISHING REAL AND
PERSONAL RIGHTS IN WAGONER V. CHEVRON USA
INCORPORATED II
Michael C. Wynne ∗
I. INTRODUCTION
No discussion of oil and gas operations in Louisiana would be
complete without the discussion of “legacy” litigation. In
Louisiana legacy suits have proliferated. A legacy lawsuit refers to
a suit by a landowner claiming that oil and gas operations caused
damage to his property through contamination or pollution.
Legacy suits impose substantial burdens on the oil and gas
operators allegedly responsible for damage to contaminated
property and production sites. Even before a legislative response
was made to these economically damaging suits, Louisiana courts
developed and refined a jurisprudential rule referred to as the
“Subsequent Purchaser Doctrine.” This judicially-created doctrine
provides that a purchaser cannot recover from a third-party for
damage inflicted prior to the sale. 1 The distinction between real
and personal rights is fundamental for a proper understanding of
the doctrine. This paper will discuss the operation of the
Subsequent Purchaser Doctrine, and the importance of the
distinction between real and personal rights, through the lens of the
influential Wagoner v. Chevron USA Incorporated 2 (“Wagoner
II”) decision.
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1. Ashley M. Liuzza, Buyer Beware: How Purchasers are Left Holding
the Bag When it comes to Property Damages, 57 LOY. L. REV. 375, 381 (2011).
2. Wagoner v. Chevron USA, Inc., 48,119 (La. App. 2 Cir. 7/24/13), 121
So. 3d 727 [hereinafter Wagoner II].
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Wagoner v. Chevron USA Incorporated (“Wagoner I”)
Understanding the breadth and purport of the Wagoner II
decision requires insight into the earlier related judgment,
Wagoner I. 3 In Wagoner I, the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of
Appeals reviewed a surface owners’ claim for damages against
lessees for contamination of the land that took place prior to the
surface owners’ acquisition of the same. The court, articulating the
Subsequent Purchaser Doctrine stated:
The general rule, often referred to as the subsequent
purchaser doctrine, is that a purchaser cannot recover from
a third party for property damage inflicted prior to the sale.
It is the landowner at the time of the alleged damages who
has a real and actual interest to assert a claim. 4
More importantly, for the purposes of this note, the court
premised their decision on the following analysis:
The right to damages conferred by a lease, whether arising
under a mineral lease or a predial lease, is a personal right,
not a property right . . . it does not pass to the new owners
of the land when there is no specific conveyance of that
right in the instrument of sale. 5
Relying upon the Subsequent Purchaser Doctrine, the court
ruled in favor of the defendant lessees, based on an exception of no
right of action. The court noted that the plaintiffs were not parties
to the mineral leases obtained by the operator who damaged the
land and the landowner who held the real right of ownership at the
time of the injury. 6 However, the court suggested, in dicta, that the
subsequent landowners could have brought a claim for these
damages if they had secured an express assignment of the right to

3. Wagoner v. Chevron USA Incorporated, 55 So. 3d 12 (La.App. 2 Cir.
2010) [hereinafter Wagoner I].
4. Id. at 22-23 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
5. Id. at 23.
6. Id.
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sue the mineral lessees for property damage that took place before
their purchase of the property. 7
B. Wagoner v. Chevron USA Incorporated (“Wagoner II”)
After the Wagoner I decision, the plaintiffs (“assignees”)
obtained an assignment of 99% of the rights from the owners of the
mineral servitudes (“assignors”), and for a second time brought
suit to recover for damages to the property caused by oil
exploration and production by the lessees. 8 Significantly, the
assignors, unlike the assignees, had a real right in the land at the
time the property was damaged by the lessees’ operations. The
assignors conveyed a personal right (the right to request damages)
through the assignments to their assignee, the subsequent surface
owners.
In Wagoner II, the primary issue before the court was whether
the assignees’ acquisition of the assignors’ right to sue for damages
to the property changed the capacity in which the subsequent
surface owners appeared, such that the assignee could defeat the
defendants’ claims of res judicata. At first blush, the question
before the court was purely procedural, and the court dispensed
with the issue concluding that in Wagoner II, the subsequent
surface owners, through the aforementioned assignments, “stepped
into the shoes” of the prior assignees who had a real interest in the
property at the time of the damage. 9 The court reasoned that in
Wagoner I the subsequent surface owners filed suit in their
capacity as present surface owners who acquired the property after
the damage occurred. However, in Wagoner II, the subsequent
surface owners sued in their capacity as assignees of the rights of
the prior mineral servitude owners. This change in capacity was
sufficient to defeat the defendants’ claims of res judicata.

7.
8.
9.

Id.
Wagoner II, 121 So. 3d at 727.
Id. at 729.
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The Second Circuit affirmed the trial court’s finding in favor of
the defendants’ exception of res judicata in relation to the claims
brought by the plaintiffs in their capacity as “surface owners” as
adjudicated in Wagoner I. 10 These claims were dismissed with
prejudice. However, the assignees’ claims brought in their capacity
as the mineral servitude owners’ assignees survived the
defendants’ exceptions of res judicata. The matter was remanded
for further proceedings on those claims. 11 Dispensing with the
procedural issue at hand, Wagoner II demonstrated the application
of the dicta from Wagoner I. The distinction between real and
personal rights was an outcome-determinative feature in the
Wagoner decisions.
III. COMMENTARY
A. Patrimonial Rights and their Subdivision
A patrimonial right is one susceptible to monetary evaluation.12
Patrimonial rights are further divided into real rights and personal
rights (credit rights), and it is this distinction that was
determinative in Wagoner II. 13 Real rights, unlike personal rights,
require only one subject, the holder of the right. 14 This holder
exerts “a direct and immediate power over the thing which is the
object of the right.” 15 In contrast, a personal right, such as a creditright, “presupposes an active subject, the creditor or obligee, and a
passive one, the debtor or obligor.” 16 Because a real right is
exerted directly over a thing, it is considered “absolute” (in the
sense that the holder of a real right can hold it against everyone). 17
10. Id. at 735-36.
11. Id. at 736.
12. ALAIN A. LEVASSEUR, LOUISIANA LAW OF OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL:
A PRÉCIS 25 (LexisNexis 2006).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 8 (§1.5).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 9.
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In contrast, a credit-right is relative because its holder may only
demand performance from a specific debtor. 18
The distinction between real and personal rights is muddled in
practical application. This distinction is particularly problematic
“when the performance relates to a thing, especially an immovable
thing.” 19 Professor Litvinoff provided an example of this difficulty
and set forth the proper analysis to navigate the problem. He
articulated:
Thus, the indemnity owed to an owner for the expropriation
of a part of his immovable property, and the damages owed
to the owner of a thing for its partial destruction or for an
interference with his rights in it, belong to the person who
was owner at the time of the expropriation, destruction, or
interference, as the right to demand indemnity or to demand
damages is a personal right that is not transferred together
with the thing. 20
In the case of ownership or other real rights the actor has direct
power over a thing, which may be held against the world; whereas,
in the case of personal rights, such as the right to damages arising
out of damage to an immovable, the actor’s right is relative (in the
sense that the actor is entitled to receive a performance from only
one or more persons in particular). In the instant case, the right to
claim damages arising out of the pollution of a landowner’s
immovable property is a personal right.
B. Application: Personal Rights in the Wagoner Decisions
The Wagoner decisions represent prominent examples of the
problem identified above: instances when the performance of an
obligation relates to a thing, especially an immovable thing.
Consequently, the determination of the nature of the rights in
Wagoner I and II is as essential as it is challenging. In the Wagoner
18.
19.

Id.
SAÚL LITVINOFF, 5 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE. THE LAW OF
OBLIGATIONS 46 (§3.3) (2d ed., West 2001).
20. Id., citing comment (e) to LA. CIV. CODE art. 1764 (emphasis added).
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decisions, the courts accurately concluded that the right to damages
arising out of the lease agreement between the lessee and the
original landowner was a personal right, not a real right. As
reproduced above, the Wagoner I court stated:
The right to damages conferred by a lease, whether arising
under a mineral lease or a predial lease, is a personal right,
not a property right; it does not pass to the new owners of
the land when there is no specific conveyance of that right
in the instrument of sale. 21
This holding is consistent with the nature of the right springing
from the damages to the land caused by the lessees’ conduct. As
noted in the example provided above, damages owed to the owner
of a thing for its partial destruction belong to the person who was
owner at the time of the destruction, as the right to demand
damages is a personal right that is not transferred together with
the thing. This is the very conclusion the court reached in Wagoner
I, when it determined that, absent a specific assignment of that
personal right to collect damages from the previous owners, the
subsequent landowners did not have a valid claim.
The determination that the rights to claim damages under the
lease were personal rather than real was significant. Namely, the
subsequent landowners did not acquire a right to the action through
their purchase of the land, as they would have if the right had been
deemed “real,” in the sense that it “runs with the land.” 22 As a
consequence of the personal nature of the right, the subsequent
owners needed to purchase the right to claim damages from the
original owners.
The right to sue for damages vested in the patrimony of the
original owners and was not transferred with the property, and that
is why an assignment of right to claim damages was necessary for
the subsequent owners to bring a suit. It also explains why the
plaintiffs sued in a different capacity after acquiring this right.
21.
22.

Wagoner I, 55 So. 3d at 23.
See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1763 & 1764.
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Effectively, the subsequent landowners tested the dicta articulated
by the Wagoner I court to the effect that a specific conveyance of
that right would permit them to exercise the personal right to
damages against the lessees. The subsequent landowners’ efforts
were successful in that respect.
IV. CONCLUSION
The exploration of the characteristics of real and personal
rights is not a purely academic exercise; rather, this distinction can
have significant consequences. Principally, for landowners, the
lesson is that an act of conveyance should include a specific
conveyance of any and all personal rights arising out of the
ownership of the immovable. Prudent landowners who wish to
acquire personal rights are cautioned by the Wagoner decisions to
make these personal rights part and parcel to their bargain with the
original landowner. For oil and gas operators, this decision could
prove bothersome, as it demonstrates that a subsequent landowner,
through an assignment of the personal right to claim damages, can
acquire and effectively exercise that right even if the assignment
does not occur in the original act of conveyance. These
assignments do not increase an operator’s liability. However, they
may provide a right to sue for damages to a more litigious
landowner.

